Accident  and  Accidental Means  in Indiana by unknown
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 36 | Issue 3 Article 6
Spring 1961
"Accident" and "Accidental Means" in Indiana
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Insurance Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
(1961) ""Accident" and "Accidental Means" in Indiana," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 36 : Iss. 3 , Article 6.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol36/iss3/6
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
"ACCIDENT" AND "ACCIDENTAL MEANS" IN INDIANA
In a recent Indiana case the deceased insured had taken out an in-
surance policy containing a double indemnity provision which was pay-
able if ". . . the death of the insured resulted directly and independently
of all other causes from bodily injury effected solely through external,
violent and accidental means. . . ."' The insured had voluntarily sub-
mitted to an injection of an anaesthetic in preparation to having his ap-
pendix removed. He had an unknown hypersensitivity to the anaesthetic
and died as a result of the injection. The Indiana Appellate Court denied
recovery under the double indemnity clause holding that Indiana, in ac-
cordance with the majority of states, makes a distinction between policies
which contain the phrase "accidental means" and those which contain the
phrase "accidental injury, result or death." The attempted distinction
between these phrases has resulted in considerable litigation2 and com-
ment by legal writers.3 The interpretation put on the phrases also has
resulted in a conflict of opinion between the states."
It is generally agreed that the words "accidental" and "accident"
have no technical, legal meaning and that they are to be defined accord-
ing to the understanding of the average man.5 "Accidental" denotes
happening by chance, or not as expected.' "Accident" denotes an event
which takes place without foresight or expectation.7 Both terms refer
to the unusual.'
An accident insurance policy phrased in terms of making an insur-
ance company liable for "death or injury from external, violent and ac-
cidental means" (cause) as opposed to a policy which imposes liability
on the insurance company for "accidental injury, result or death" (ef-
1. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bruner, 153 N.E.2d 616, 617 (Ind. App. 1958). This
is the usual provision in a double indemnity clause. Kisch, Accidental Means, 1953 INS.
L.J. 545.
2. See Kisch, Accidental Means, 1953 INs. L.J. 545, which reports that there have
been over three hundred cases on the subject.
3. E.g., 2 RIcHARDs, INSURANCE §§ 206-218 (5th ed. 1952); 19 LA. L. REv. 185
(1958); 10 AK. L. REv. 226 (1956) ; 10 InD. L.J. 262 (1935).
4. See Annot., 166 A.L.R. 469 (1947).
5. See Donohue v. Washington Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 259 Ky. 611, 82 S.W.2d 780
(1935) ; Goethe v. New York Life Ins. Co., 183 S.C. 199, 190 S.E. 451 (1937); 2
RicHAWDS, INSURANcE § 214 (5th ed. 1952).
6. United States Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100 (1889).
7. Supreme Council of the Order of Chosen Friends v. Garrigus, 104 Ind. 133, 3
N.E. 818 (1885).
8. United States Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100 (1889) ; 2 RIcHARDs, IN-
SURANCE § 214 (5th ed. 1952).
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fect) may or may not preclude recovery in a given fact situation depend-
ing on a court's interpretation of the word "means." Insurance contracts
phrased in the latter phraseology (effect) are generally understood to in-
clude injuries sustained as a consequence of a voluntary act, the result
being undesigned and unexpected,9 and the courts are generally in agree-
ment in the application of the law to a given fact situation. 0 Contracts
in the former phraseology (cause) have led some courts to follow a "clas-
sical" position and to deny recovery if a person is injured as a result of
his intentional act, even though the result of the act is unexpected, un-
foreseen and unanticipated.1 The theory these courts have adopted is
that the means as well as the result must be accidental, and the words
"accidental means" limit recovery to those situations where the result is
a consequence of an unintentional act. 2 However, other courts treat the
term "accidental means" as being synonymous with the term "accidental
result,"1 3 following a "liberal" view,'4 and if the result is unexpected,
unforeseen and unanticipated, even though the act is intentional, recovery
is granted under insurance contracts phrased in terms of accidental means.
The theory in these cases is that an insurance policy should be construed
according to the understanding of the average insurance policyholder,
and further, that there can be no logical distinction between cause and
effect in the accident situation. The situation under litigation is perme-
ated by "accident" throughout, or there is no "accident" involved at all.'"
Indiana courts in professing to follow the classical position interpret
that position to mean that in the doing of an intentional act, there must
be a mischance, slip or mishap occurring in the doing of the act itself
in order for a beneficiary to recover under an insurance contract phrased
9. 2 RIcHARDS, INSURANCE § 215 (5th ed. 1952).
10. See, e.g., Byrd v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 217 Miss. 761, 65 So. 2d 249 (1953);
Supreme Council of the Order of Chosen Friends v. Garrigus, 104 Ind. 133, 3 N.E. 818
(1885).
11. See, e.g., Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491 (1934) ; Cald-
well v. Travelers Ins. Co., 305 Mo. 619, 267 S.W. 907 (1924).
12. 2 RIcHARDs, INSURANCE § 215 (5th ed. 1952).
13. See, e.g., Western Commercial Travelers' Ass'n v. Smith, 85 Fed. 401 (8th Cir.
1898) ; Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 41, 2 N.W.2d 576 (1942).
14. United States Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100 (1889), seems to be one
of the earliest cases on the interpretation of "accidental means." It is interesting to note
that a case widely cited for the classical approach, Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 291 U.S. 491 (1934), quotes the Barry case with approval, while Western Commer-
cial Travleers' Ass'n v. Smith, 85 Fed. 401 (8th Cir. 1898), the case most widely cited
for the liberal approach, also refers to the Barry case with approval. This contradic-
tion may perhaps be explained on the ground that the Landress case looks only to the
language of the court instruction to the jury in the Barry case, while the Sinith case
looks to both the instruction and how the jury applied it.
15. Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 501 (1934) (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
in terms of accidental means. While this may seem to be a departure
from the classical position, and has been treated as being a modification
of the classical rule, 6 this seems to be an unnecessary refinement. If the
slip or mishap causes the injury, any intentional conduct preceding the
slip or mishap becomes immaterial. "Means" in accident policies must
be vigorously confined to proximate and not remote causes of injury.1
Therefore, when slip or mishap is involved and is the proximate cause of
injury, recovery under a policy phrased in terms of accidental means
would be granted under either the classical or the liberal approach. The
Indiana courts, however, continue to assert that in these situations they
follow the classical approach in allowing recovery. Therefore, in the
Indiana cases, it is not surprising to find that recovery is granted under
insurance policies covering bodily injury or death from accidental means
where the insured has fallen and broken his leg which resulted in a de-
cline in health, pneumonia and death, 8 or fallen and injured his skull
which resulted in apoplexy.'9 Under the same contractual provisions, re-
covery has been granted in a situation where the insured slipped against
the end of a bathtub he was carrying and punctured a gastric ulcer which
necessitated surgery, the insured dying from post-operative pneumonia."
Other clearly non-volitional and thus non-controversial acts as far as
the Indiana courts are concerned, for which recovery has been granted,
include situations such as the following: the insured, while walking down
the sidewalk, stubbed his toe on a water box protruding two inches above
the sidewalk, fell to the ground, and died ;21 the insured, while sleeping,
moved his hand to a position so that it was between his head and the edge
of the bed rail, the pressure on the hand resulting in an inflammation of
the periosteum of the metacarpal bones ;22 and where the insured choked
to death on regurgitated food lodged in his windpipe.23 In many of these
cases, the main issue litigated is that of proximate cause; but these cases
16. See 10 Apiu. L. Rev. 226 (1956).
17. Carter v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 217 Ind. 282, 27 N.E.2d 75 (1940).
18. Robinson v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 76 Ind. App. 161, 129 N.E. 707
(1921).
19. National Benefit Ass'n v. Grauman, 107 Ind. 288, 7 N.E. 233 (1886).
20. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Schrader, 107 Ind. App. 235, 19 N.E.2d 887 (1939).
21. Continental Cas. Co. v. Lloyd, 165 Ind. 52, 73 N.E. 824 (1905).
22. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 165 Ind. 317, 75 N.E. 262 (1905).
23. See Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. Menard, 124 Ind. App. 606, 117 N.E.2d 376 (1954),
where the policy imposed liability for death due to external, violent and accidental
means. Compare McCallum v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 175 F. Supp. 3 (E.D. Va. 1959),
criticizing the Menard position that it makes no difference whether mechanical (i.e., non-
volitional) action occurred after taking food internally for the first time and resulting
in asphyxiation or whether mechanical action precipitated lodging of food substance in
the windpipe after regurgitation. McCalum holds that in the case of regurgitation,
there are no external means.
NOTES
also stand for the proposition that given a mischance, slip or mishap ac-
companying the intentional act, the Indiana courts will hold the means
to be accidental. On the same general hypothesis, Indiana courts allow
recovery for unprovoked injurious attack by a third person on an in-
sured, holding that the means are accidental.24 Recovery also is granted
in the same situation when the policy is phrased in terms of accidental
result.2 '
Where the proximate cause of the injury is an intentional act of the
insured, however, there is a line of Indiana cases in which the classical
doctrine is applied and recovery is denied, the courts holding the means
not to be accidental. In Schmid v. Indiana Travelers Acc. Ass'n,2" the in-
sured, a person who normally resided in Indiana, carried a bag up one
hundred steps in the rarified atmosphere of Colorado and suffered a
heart attack on the top step. Circulatory failure and a fall resulting in a
head injury, along with paralysis of the heart occasioned by muscular
exertion were alleged to have caused death. The trial court sustained a
demurrer to the complaint which was affirmed by the appellate court. As
no question of pre-existing heart disease was presented, the court af-
firmed solely on the ground that there was nothing accidental about the
rarified air of Colorado and that climbing the steps was intentional; the
means, therefore, were not accidental and recovery was denied.
The Indiana cases on lifting and resulting strain, hernia or disloca-
tion of a bone are confusing. In Puritan Bed Spring Co. v. Wolfe,2" an
employee in the course of employment lifted a bale of wire weighing one
hundred and fifty pounds and suffered a rupture. In granting recovery
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the court held that the accident
as opposed to disease was the proximate cause of injury on which com-
24. Phoenix Acc. Ass'n v. Stiver, 42 Ind. App. 636, 84 N.E. 772 (1908). See
Hessler v. Federal Cas. Co., 190 Ind. 78, 129 N.E. 325 (1921); Travelers' Protective
Ass'n of America v. Fawcett, 56 Ind. App. 111, 104 N.E. 99 (1914), where the insurance
policies involved were claimed to have clauses in them, the effect of which was to ex-
empt the insurer from liability if injury to the insured was intentionally inflicted by
third persons. In reaching the desired result of recovery in the Hessler case, the court
held that such an excluding clause conflicted with other more prominent provisions of
the contract, and resolved the ambiguity in favor of the insured. In the Fawcett case,
the insured, while standing with a group of men, was shot by a bank robber and the
court by a process of highly refined reasoning held that assuming just for the purpose
of that case that there was exemption from liability in the case of intentional injuries
inflicted by third persons, that the trial court found that the shooting was indiscriminate
and that the robber in shooting had not specifically singled out the insured; therefore,
recovery was granted. It is interesting to note that in the Stiver case, the court said that
if the injury was unforeseen by the insured, the means were accidental.
25. See Supreme Council of the Order of Chosen Friends v. Garrigus, 104 Ind.
133, 3 N.E. 818 (1885).
26. 42 Ind. App. 483, 85 N.E. 1032 (1908).
27. 68 Ind. App. 330, 120 N.E. 417 (1918).
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pensation was to be based and that "accident" in compensation cases was
to be given its popular meaning of being an unlooked-for mishap or an
untoward event which is unexpected and undesigned. In Seipel v. Equit-
able Life Ins. Co.," an action was brought against the insurer on the
ground that death, which resulted from pneumonia following an opera-
tion on a hernia sustained from lifting a heavy wheel, was covered by an
insurance policy phrased in terms of accidental means. A verdict was
directed for the defendant insurance company, the court holding that the
means employed were intentional.29 The conclusion to be drawn from a
comparison of the Wolfe and the Seipel cases is that once the court leaves
the area of workmen's compensation and enters into the realm of insur-
ance law, the rights of parties in analogous situations are considerably
different. The presence of the word "means," which the court "under-
stood" to have been put into the insurance contract with the full under-
standing and intent of both parties, was outcome determinative. In
American Income Ins. Co. v. Kindlesparker, the trial court had made a
"special" finding that the insured railroad section foreman ". . . re-
ceived personal injuries as a result of an accident while engaged in lift-
ing a handcar . . ."" The appellate court affirmed a judgment for the
insured, holding that this finding would support the conclusion that the
means were accidental, although the court did not indicate whether slip
or strain was the basis on which it rested its finding. The case law was
settled three years later, however, in Orey v. Mutual Life Ins. Co." The
circumstantial evidence was such that expert opinion was necessary on
the question of whether the hernia sustained by the deceased insured
while cranking his truck was caused by strain, a fall, or a blow. The
experts differed as to whether such an injury could be caused by strain.
However, the court said that only if the jury found that the hernia was
caused by a slip or a blow could the means be held accidental and recovery
be granted. Injury from strain would not constitute accidental means.
In Husbands v. Indiana Travelers' Acc. Assn,32 the insured, while
shaking down the ashes in a furnace, ruptured a blood vessel in his lung
and died. At the time of the injury he had tuberculosis and his lungs
were weak from the disease. The court denied recovery under the policy
on the ground that the means were not accidental; the act was habitual,
28. 59 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1932).
29. See Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Van Altena, 67 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1933), where
the court observed that in the Seipel case the insured failed to show that means other
than those intentionally employed were the efficient cause of injury.
30. 102 Ind. App. 445, 448, 200 N.E. 432, 434 (1936).
31. 215 Ind. 305, 19 N.E.2d 547 (1939).
32. 194 Ind. 586, 133 N.E. 130 (1923).
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intentional, and done in the usual way; there was no evidence of a slip
or stumble; there was no evidence that he met with an accident of any
kind except that he ruptured a vessel weakened by disease which he did
not intend to rupture. The court did not address itself to the rather press-
ing issue of proximate cause, on which it also would seem that recovery
should be denied.
In Pearlman v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co.,"3 a dentist had
taken out an accident insurance policy with an accidental means clause.
He had used an X-ray machine almost daily for a period of twenty years
in his dental practice. Due to overexposure to X-rays, his thumbs and
index fingers became ulcerated and malignant. He was unable to give
any date or specific dates on which such exposure had occurred. The
Indiana court denied recovery saying that since the intentional acts of
the insured exposing him to the X-rays were not accompanied by mis-
chance, slip or mishap, the injury was not caused by accidental means;
even though the result was unusual, unexpected or unforeseen and there-
fore accidental, the means were not accidental. The classical doctrine
was followed again in 1958."4
While the previously discussed cases present examples of the appli-
cation of the classical doctrine by Indiana courts, there is another line of
Indiana cases which present examples of somewhat erratic exceptions to
its application.3" In United States Cas. Co. v. Griffis, the insured died
from eating mushrooms in a restaurant which, unknown to him, were
tainted with ptomaine poison. The court, relying heavily on an early
New York decision, 6 held that although the insured intended to eat the
mushrooms, he did not intend to eat the poison.3
In James v. State Life Ins. Co.,"3 a barber opened a small pimple or
33. 126 Ind. App. 294, 130 N.E.2d 54 (1956).
34. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bruner, 153 N.E.2d 616 (Ind. App. 1958), dis-
cussed supra.
35. But it should be noted that the latest Indiana case on the subject applied the
classical doctrine. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bruner, supra note 34.
36. Paul v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 112 N.Y. 472, 20 N.E. 347 (1889). New York has
since repudiated any distinction between accidental means and accidental result. Mans-
bacher v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 273 N.Y. 140, 7 N.E.2d 18 (1937).
37. 186 Ind. 126, 129, 114 N.E. 83, 84 (1916), where the court says: "Appellant
vigorously assails the New York case, and those of other jurisdictions following it,
and earnestly contends that, while the death may have been accidental and violent, it
was not effected by accidental and violent means; that Mr. Griffis voluntarily ate the
mushrooms, and the mere fact that an unexpected result followed in nowise makes the
means accidental within the meaning of the language of the policy." An Indiana court
in a workmens' compensation case has cited the Griffis case for the proposition that
"An injury may be the result of accidental means though the act involving the accident
was intentional." General American Tank Car Corp. v. Weirick, 77 Ind. App. 242, 245,
133 N.E. 391, 392 (1921).
38. 83 Ind. App. 344, 147 N.E. 533 (1925).
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boil on the chin of the insured with a blackhead eradicator which was in-
fected with streptococci. The streptococci spread through the system of
the insured and caused his death. The court rejected the argument of
the insurance company that the act of the barber was intentional and con-
sented to by the insured and said that the instrument involved was not
merely an eradicator, but an infected eradicator. Since there was no con-
sent to the use of an infected eradicator, the court allowed recovery. The
court, in holding that there was something unforeseen and unexpected in
the means and that therefore the value of the policy should accrue to the
beneficiary, cited the Griffis case as having applied the same principle.
In Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Royster,"9 the complaint alleged that the in-
sured, while giving himself a treatment for hemorrhoids, was using a
tube to introduce medicine into the lower bowels and accidentally and
unintentionally punctured the lower bowels which resulted in his death
three days later. The court held that the cause was accidental on the
basis of evidence that he had unintentionally inserted the tube in the
wrong place. The court did not seem to address itself directly to specific
questions of evidence, but merely said that:
A fair consideration of the evidence in this case would indicate
that when the assured used this instrument, which he had used
before to medicate his hemorrhoids, something accidental and
unexpected did occur, that is, that the instrument was, on ac-
count of some unexpected occurrence, while he was using it,
unintentionally inserted beyond the place where the medicine
was intended to be used, and the injury thus produced.4"
Following the classical rule, a slip in such circumstances would be the
only situation under which the means would be accidental.
In Police & Firemen's Ins. Ass'n v. Blunk,4" the insured fireman, in
the line of duty, went into a burning building filled with smoke, and died
from the effects. The issue litigated was one of proximate cause, the
insurer contending that coronary occlusion was a disease. The company
did not contend that the means were not accidental. It seems that this
was an oversight, as under the classical rationale, a fireman might rea-
sonably be said to be aware of the noxious quality inherent in the smoke.
The latent, pernicious quality, such as the poison in the mushrooms in the
Griffis case or the germs on the blackhead eradicator in the James case,
was not considered.
39. 196 Ind. 629, 149 N.E. 164 (1925).
40. Id. at 631, 149 N.E. at 165.
41. 107 Ind. App. 279, 20 N.E.2d 660 (1939).
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In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glassman, 42 the deceased was found
dead on a garage floor. The evidence tended to prove that death was
due to carbon monoxide poisoning from fumes from the exhaust of the
automobile in the closed garage. The issue litigated was suicide, the in-
surance company admitting that if death was caused by fumes from the
exhaust and the insured fell as a result and was overcome while lying on
the floor, there would be liability. From the language of the opinion,
it is difficult to ascertain how much weight the court put on the fall in
holding that there were two possible inferences that could be drawn
when the jury considered the question of accidental means: death due to
suicide and death due to accident. Further, any weight given to the slip
would seem to be damaging to the classical rule as, once suicide is ruled
out, it may be said that the fall is not the point on which the case should
turn, but that the intentional act of remaining in the garage and breath-
ing the fumes would be the question to be considered.
Perhaps the most significant Indiana case on accidental means is
Elsey v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.43 The plaintiff, who was insured against
bodily injury sustained through accidental means and specifically for
sunstroke sustained through accidental means, was riding on an open
streetcar which left the shaded portion of a street, exposing him to the
rays of the sun. As he was about to alight from the streetcar at an un-
shaded place, he suffered a sunstroke. The court rejected the argument
of the insurer that the means were not accidental as the exposure to the
sun's rays was intentionally brought about by the insured in his ordinary
course of life and occupation, as opposed to a situation of shipwreck
where a person is left, against his will, exposed to the heat of the sun.
In refusing to follow this view of older cases,44 the court said:
The purpose of accident insurance is to protect the insured
against accidents that occur while he is going about his business
in the usual way, without any thought of being injured or killed,
and when there is no probability, in the ordinary course of
events, that he will suffer injury or death. The reason men
secure accident insurance is to protect them from the unfore-
seen, unusual, and unexpected injury that might happen to
them while pursuing the usual and ordinary routine of their
42. 224 Ind. 641, 70 N.E.2d 24 (1946).
43. 187 Ind. 447, 120 N.E. 42 (1918).
44. Dozier v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 46 Fed. 446 (W.D. Mo. 1891) ; Continental Cas.
Co. v. Pittman, 145 Ga. 641, 89 S.E. 716 (1916) ; Semancik v. Continental Cas. Co., 56
Pa. Super. 392 (1914) ; Sinclair v. Maritime Passengers' Assur. Co., 3 Ell. & Ell. 478,
121 Eng. Rep. 521 (K.B. 1861).
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daily vocation, or the doing of things that men do in the com-
mon everyday affairs of life.
'We are of opinion that the better reasoning points out, and the
weight of authority holds, the true test to be that, if in the act
which precedes the injury, though an intentional act, something
unusual, unforeseen, and unexpected occurs which produces the
injury, it is accidental; but, if in the act which precedes the in-
jury something usual, foreseen and expected occurs which pro-
duces the injury, it is not accidentally effected. . . .'
The court therefore based its opinion on the broad ground of the purpose
of accident insurance followed by what is substantially a paraphrase of
the opinion of the court in United States Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. Barry." The
court held the means to be accidental, but it did not point out exactly what
was the unforeseen occurrence which accompanied the intentional act. In
the extensive comment which has been made on the Elsey case, jurisdic-
tions which have repudiated the distinction between accidental means and
accidental result, injury or death have cited it for the proposition that the
distinction between accidental injury and accidental means cannot be
maintained and injury from overexposure to the sun therefore has been
held to have occurred by accidental means." This view is evidently based
on the portion of the opinion of the court concerning the purposes of ac-
cident insurance, since no distinction between intentional and uninten-
tional exposure was mentioned. Jurisdictions which profess an adher-
ence to the strict rule of interpretation of accidental means, however,
have cited the Elsey case, in granting recovery," carving out what seems
to be an exception to the general rule of strict construction. Some of
these jurisdictions have relied upon Elsey in denying recovery on the
ground that the means were not accidental, thereby tending to overlook
the Indiana court's stand on the purposes of insurance policies. These
courts say in effect that teleological causation is the determinant which
makes the means accidental." That is, the argument proceeds on the
45. Elsey v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 187 Ind. 447, 449, 120 N.E. 42, 43 (1918).
46. 131 U.S. 100 (1889). See note 14 sapra.
47. See, e.g., Hu'ss v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 37 F. Supp. 364 (D. Conn.
1941) ; Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Green, 172 Okla. 591, 46 P.2d 372 (1935).
48. Hammer v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 158 Ohio St. 394, 109 N.E.2d
649 (1952), where the court held that it is not necessary for the means to be accidental
for the exposure to the sun to be the result of an accident.
49. See Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 497 (1934) ; Nick-
man v. New York Life Ins. Co., 39 F.2d 763, 764 (6th Cir. 1930) ; Ruona v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 68 F. Supp. 923; 927 (W.D. Mich. 1946) ; Caldwell v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
305 Mo. 619, 267 S.W. 907 (1924). In Nickman v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra, the
court said that the insured was exposed to a mishap or misadventure when the streetcar
drew from the shade into the sun.
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tenuous basis that exposure was not voluntary in the Elsey case since the
streetcar pulled from the shade into the sun and thus the situation is
analogous to the shipwreck situation. Indiana cases subsequent to the
Elsey case, however, show that in Indiana the argument based on teleo-
logical causation is repudiated, and the present impact of the case is that
the means are accidental when the injury is sunstroke, regardless of
whether the exposure to the sun is "voluntary." In Benefit Ass'n of Ry.
Employees v. Hulet,"0 an insured brakeman working on a train suffered
a sunstroke; the court held the injury to have been caused by accidental
means. In Wiecking v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co.,"' the insured died
from a sunstroke while playing golf; the means were held to be accidental
and recovery was granted, the Elsey case being cited as controlling
authority in Indiana for the proposition that sunstroke is caused by ac-
cidental means. The Elsey case has also been cited as support for the
theories used to hold the means accidental in the previously discussed
cases of James v. State Life Ins. Co., 2 Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Royster,"3 and
Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. Menard"
That confusion results from an attempt to apply the classical doc-
trine becomes apparent from a comparison of the Indiana cases. It is
difficult to understand why the rarified air of Colorado which was
noxious to the deceased was considered to be non-accidental means, or
why overexposure to X-rays or hypersensitivity to a drug was treated as
non-accidental means, when one considers other Indiana decisions. Eat-
ing poisonous mushrooms, contact with an infected blackhead eradicator,
entering a building known to be filled with physically harmful smoke,
and remaining in a closed garage with exhaust fumes of an automobile
filling the space with carbon monoxide would seem to be instances which
would require application of the same principle. An unknown or ig-
nored pernicious quality was present in all of these cases and that quality
harmed the insured.
The unreliability of application of the classical doctrine is not con-
50. 107 Ind. App. 633, 26 N.E.2d 548 (1940).
51. 116 F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1940). It is interesting to note that Huss v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America, 37 F. Supp. 364 (D. Conn. 1941), cites Wiecking as a case uphold-
ing the Cardozo dissent in Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 501
(1934), which argues complete abrogation of any attempted distinction between acci-
dental result, injury or death and accidental means. The Weicking case also rejects the
view put forth in 10 IND. L.J. 262 (1935), that the Elsey result may be attributed to the
insurance policy insuring, specifically, for "sunstroke suffered through accidental means"
and that this created an ambiguity to be resolved in favor of the insured, sunstroke nor-
mally being considered out of the area of accidental means in Indiana.
52. 83 Ind. App. 344, 147 N.E. 533 (1925).
53. 196 Ind. 629, 149 N.E. 164 (1925).
54. 124 Ind. App. 606, 117 N.E.2d 376 (1954). See note 23 supra.
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fined to the borders of Indiana. While the Indiana court has considered
death'to have occurred through accidental means where the insured ate
poisonous mushrooms, a North Carolina court has held that there were
no accidental fieans and thus no recovery of benefits of an insurance
policy where the insured drank a large amount of liquor and died, and
an autopsy showed that there was a poisonous substance in the stomach.5
The'North Carolina court held that it did not appear that the deceased
took the poison by "mistake." The Indiana court has allowed recovery
where'the insured died from streptococci on a'blackhead eradicator. The
Alabama Supreme Court, however, has held that where the insured took
tweezers which he knew to be unsterilized and removed a hair from a
pimple and the pimple became infected, the means causing the infection
were not accidental. The court held that while other jurisdictions might
not recognize the distinction between accidental means and accidental
results, there is such a distinction and a contract must be enforced ac-
cording to its clear terms. Using the tweezers was an intentional act and
an insurance contract phrased in terms of accidental means does not im-
pose liability for accidental results of intended means."
Indiana seems to have made an exception to the classical doctrine in
the sunstroke cases and allows recovery.57 Other jurisdictions maintain-
ing the classical doctrine have held the means to be non-accidental and
have denied recovery where the insured in loading cross-ties on a rail-
road suffered injury from exposure to the sun's rays, 8 or where the
insured suffered sunstroke while playing golf.59
The Indiana court has held the means to be non-accidental where the
insured died from a drug to which he was hypersensitive. The Supreme
Court of Michigan has held the means to be accidental in a similar situa-
tion While still professing to follow the strict rule."0 The Michigan court
in holding that the means were "clearly" accidental said that as a result
of the act preceding the death of the insured (administration of the
anaesthetic) due to the insured's hypersusceptibility, there was an un-
foreseen, unexpected and unusual occurrence (death) which followed.
The conclusion is that there is substantial disagreement among jurisdic-
tions professing to follow the classical rule as to what constitutes acci-
dental means.
55. Mehaf fey v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 205 N.C. 701, 172 S.E. 331 (1934).
56. Northam v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 231 Ala. 105, 163 So. 635 (1935).
57. See Wiecking v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 116 F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1940) ; El-
sey v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 187 Ind. 447, 120 N.E. 42 (1918) ; Benefit Ass'n of Ry. Em-
ployees v. Hulet, 107 Ind. App. 633, 26 N.E.2d 548 (1940).
58. Rollins v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 190 Tenn. 89, 228 S.W.2d 70 (1950).
59. Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491 (1934).
60. Wheeler v. Title Guar. & Cas. Co., 265 Mich. 296, 251 N.W. 408 (1933).
NOTES.,
It is difficult to say what the majority rule on the interpretation of
accidental means is today. There are, however, indications of a trend
away from the classical rule. New York6 and Louisiana62 have over-
ruled former decisions following the classical position and now hold the
term "accidental means" to be synonymous with "accidental result."
Many states have expressly repudiated the allegation that a distinction
can be or should be made between accidental injury, death or result and
accidental means. 3 Other states still profess to maintain a distinction
between accidental means and accidental injury, result or death.6" In
these latter jurisdictions, it is necessary to emphasize that there may be
considerable vacillation in the application of the rule of strict construc-
61. See Kisch, Accidental Means, 1953 INs. L.J. 545, 550, for a history of the New
York cases.
62. Gaskins v. New York Life Ins. Co., 235 La. 461, 104 So. 2d 171 (1958), 19
LA. L. REv. 185.
63. See Union Life Ins. Co. v. Epperson, 221 Ark. 522, 254 S.W.2d 311 (1953);
Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231, 67 P.2d 80 (1937) ; King v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 123 Conn. 1, 192 Atl. 311 (1937); Raley v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 11
A.2d 110 (D.C. App. 1955); Rauert v. Loyal Protective Ins. Co., 61 Idaho 677, 106
P.2d 1015 (1940) ; Mongol v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 103 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1939) ;
Comfort v. Continental Cas. Co., 239 Iowa 1206, 34 N.W.2d 588 (1948); Thomas v.
Liberty Life Ins. Co., 131 Kan. 175, 289 Pac. 414 (1930) ; Gaskins v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 235 La. 461, 104 So. 2d 171 (1958); Taylor v. New York Life Ins. Co., 176
Minn. 171, 222 N.W. 912 (1929) ; Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 41, 2 N.W.2d
576 (1942) ; Shields v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 6 N.J. 517, 79 A.2d 297 (1951) ;
Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Ace. Ass'n of America, 295 N.Y. 294, 67 N.E.2d
248 (1946) ; Jacobson v. Mutual Benefit Health & Ace. Ass'n, 69 N.D. 632, 289 N.W.
591 (1940); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Wise, 207 Oida. 622, 251 P.2d 1058 (1952);
Goethe v. New York Life Ins. Co., 183 S.C. 199, 190 S.E. 451 (1937) ; Carter v. Standard
Acc. Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 Pac. 259 (1925) ; Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Irvin, 178
Va. 265, 16 S.E.2d 646 (1941) ; Griswold v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 107 Vt. 367, 180
Ati. 649 (1935) ; Wiger v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 205 Wis. 95, 236 N.W. 534 (1931).
64. See Bullard v. Emergency Aid Ins. Co., 39 Ala. App. 92, 103 So. 2d 44, cert.
denied, 267 Ala. 694, 103 So. 2d 50 (1957) ; Northam v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 231
Ala. 105, 163 So. 635 (1935) ; Ritchie v. Anchor Cas. Co., 135 Cal. 2d 245, 286 P.2d 1000
(1955) ; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Gutowske, 49 Del. 233, 113 A.2d 579 (1955) ;
Johnson v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 92 Ga. App. 818, 90 S.E.2d 36 (1955); Pru-
dential Ins. Co. of America v. Vay Wey, 223 Ind. 198, 59 N.E.2d 721 (1945); New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Bruner, 153 N.E.2d 616 (Ind. App. 1958) ; Mutual Benefit Health
& Acc. Ass'n v. Blanton, 306 Ky. 16, 206 S.W.2d 70 (1947) ; Home Beneficial Life Ins.
Co. v. Partain, 205 Md. 60, 106 A.2d 79 (1954) ; Reeves v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 333 Mass. 314, 130 N.E.2d 541 (1955) ; Turner v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc.
Ass'n, 316 Mich. 6, 24 N.W.2d 534 (1946) ; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Wilson.
184 Miss. 823, 185 So. 802 (1939); Caldwell v. Travelers Ins. Co., 305 Mo. 619, 267
S.W. 907 (1924); Wills v. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 108 Mont. 536, 91 P.2d 695
(1939) ; Simoneau v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 89 N.H. 402, 200 Atl. 385 (1938) ;
Allred v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 247 N.C. 105, 100 S.E.2d 226 (1957); Ham-
mer v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 158 Ohio St. 394, 109 N.E.2d 649 (1952) :
Buckles v. Continental Cas. Co., 197 Ore. 128, 251 P.2d 476 (1952) ; O'Neill - Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 345 Pa. 232, 26 A.2d 898 (1942) ; Kimball v. Massachusetts Ace.
Co., 44 R.I. 264, 117 Atl. 228 (1922); Rollins v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 190 Tenn. 89,
228 S.W.2d 70 (1950) ; Texas Prudential Ins. Co. v. Turner, 127 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939) ; Evans v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 26 Wash. 2d 594, 174 P.2d 961 (1946);
Mitchell v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 124 W. Va. 20, 18 S.E.2d 803 (1942).
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tion within a given jurisdiction, as is seen by examination of the Indiana
.cases. The case law in those jurisdictions which have expressed adher-
ence to the liberal'rule seems to be fairly well settled and consistent, al-
though there are instances where jurisdictions have followed the liberal
rule only to repudiate it in later cases."' It would seem, however, that
until there is such repudiation, it is possible to ascertain the law and pre-
dict its course to a meaningful degree.
It is suggested that Indiana should abandon the classical position
and follow the liberal view. Indiana case law abounds with the legal
maxims that insurance policies are to be construed strictly against the
insurer and that vague and ambiguous terms are to be resolved in favor
of the insured.6 That the term "accidental means" is both ambiguous
and vague is seen by a study of the cases. The older insurance policies
use the noun "assured" rather than "insured." Under the present law
of Indiana, a person may buy considerably less than the assurance as he
understands the words printed on a multi-page policy to mean. He may
be buying only peace of mind, except in the case of sunstroke."7 If in-
creased rates are necessary to provide the protection which the potential
accident insurance policyholder desires, obviously the rates must be in-
creased.
The reasons that the case law in jurisdictions abolishing the distinc-
tion and following the liberal view seems predictable as to given fact
situations are not complex. The standards employed are clear and pre-
dictable. There must be an "accident" involved," using the word in its
normal and common meaning.69 There must be evidence that the injury
was accidental."0 As disease is often intertwined with accidental injury
in the situations under which insurance contracts have been litigated, the
question of proximate cause may, in a close situation, have to go to the
65. See, e.g., Evans v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 26 Wash. 2d 594, 174 P.2d 961
(1946), overrtding Bennett v. Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co., 21 Wash. 2d 698, 152 P.2d
713 (1944), and Horsfall v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 32 Wash. 132, 72 Pac. 1028
(1903). See Mitchell v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 124 W. Va. 20, 18 S.E.2d 803
(1942), where the court reluctantly follows Otey v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
120 W. Va. 434, 199 S.E. 596 (1938), which adheres to the strict interpretation and does
not refer to Miller v. Inter-Ocean Cas. Co., 110 W. Va. 494, 158 S.E. 706 (1931), which
adopted the liberal view.
66. See, e.g., Masonic Acc. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 200 Ind. 472, 164 N.E. 628 (1929)
Atkinson v. Indiana Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 194 Ind. 563, 143 N.E. 629 (1924) ; Federal Life
Ins. Co. v. Kerr, 173 Ind. 613, 89 N.E. 398, 91 N.E. 230 (1910).
67. See note 57 supra.
68. Schroeder v. Police & Firemen's Ins. Ass'n, 300 Ill. App. 375, 21 N.E.2d 16
(1939); Rapp v. Metropolitan Acc. & Health Ins. Co., 143 Neb. 144, 8 N.W.2d 692
.(1943).
69. Gaskins v. New York Life Ins. Co., 235 La. 461, 104 So. 2d 171 (1958).
70. 1acobson v. Mutual Benefit. & Health Ass'n, 69 N.D. 632, 289 N.W. 591 (1940).
jury.71 If the pre-existing disease is only a secondary cause of dis-
ability, disease is immaterial and recovery should be granted."2 The law
need look only to see if the efficient and procuring cause of the injury
is a natural and probable consequence in consideration of the existing
circumstances and conditions in each case."3 An accident insurance policy
should be construed to give the insured the protection which he may rea-
sonably assume the language of the policy provides,"' ambiguous and
vague terms being construed in favor of the insured.7"
Applying these standards to specific fact situations, the results seem
clear. If the rarified air of Colorado is the cause of death of a person
not used to that climate, recovery should be granted." A defendant in-
surance company will be quick to present the obviously pressing issue of
pre-existing disease which may well be present in such a situation. If
a person's lungs are so weakened by disease that ordinary activity causes
rupture of a blood vessel, recovery should be denied. Disease, not ac-
cident, is the cause of death in this situation. Recovery for dentists'
overexposure to X-rays should be granted. In those jurisdictions fol-
lowing the liberal view, recovery has been allowed either on the theory
that an insurance policy is to be construed so as to give the language of
the policy the ordinary and natural meaning as understood by the average
policyholder,'7 or under the theory that there can be no logical distinction
between the two phrases and either there is accident throughout the cause
71. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Wise, 207 Okla, 622, 251 P.2d 1058 (1952).
Cf. Sharpe v. Commercial Travelers' Mut. Ace. Ass'n of America, 139 Ind. 92, 37 N.E.
353 (1894), where the insured while standing, threw up his hands and fell to the floor,
an autopsy showing a substantially diseased heart and brain and a tumor at the base of
the brain to have caused the fall. The court affirmed a directed verdict for the insur-
ance company under a policy covering accidental injuries. See generally Jones v. General
Ace., Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 118 Fla. 648, 159 So. 804 (1935).
72. Preston v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1949) ; Union Life Ins.
Co. v. Epperson, 221 Ark. 522, 254 S.W.2d 311 (1953), where the insured sustained a
perforation of an existing ulcer in lifting a shaft and the court held that if the acci-
dental injury is the primary or proximate cause of the disability, existence of disease
contributing to the disability does not preclude recovery.
73. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Johnston, 204 Ark. 307, 162 S.W.2d 480 (1942).
74. King v. Travelers Ins. Co., 123 Conn. 1, 192 Atl. 311 (1937) ; Gaskins v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 235 La. 461, 104 So. 2d 171 (1958).
75. Wilson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 82 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Idaho 1949) ; Raley
v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 117 A.2d 110 (D.C. App. 1955).
76. But cf. Schmid v. Indiana Travelers Acc. Ass'n, 42 Ind. App. 483, 85 N.E.
1032 (1908).
77. Cf. Husbands v. Indiana Travelers' Acc. Ass'n, 194 Ind. 586, 133 N.E. 130
(1923).
78. But see Pearlman v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 126 Ind. App. 294, 130
N.E.2d 54 (1956).
79. King v. Travelers Ins. Co., 123 Conn. 1, 192 At. 311 (1937).
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and its concomitant result or there is no accident at all."0 The injury
resulting from the intentional act was unanticipated, unexpected and
unforeseen, and therefore it was accidental.
Injury caused by hypersensitivity to a drug was held by the Indiana
court not to be covered by the accident policy there in question.8" Juris-
dictions repudiating the distinction have allowed recovery under policies
phrased in terms of accidental means where the insured has died from
anaphylactic shock produced by what expert medical testimony termed
to be a "very rare" blood transfusion reaction,82 where novocaine used as
an anesthetic in a tonsillectomy has killed the insured, he being hyper-
sensitive to that drug,8" and where morphine used to relieve pain has
produced systemic disturbances and subsequent death of the insured."
The theory of recovery in these cases is that hypersusceptibility is a pe-
culiarity but not an infirmity (thus solving the proximate causes issue)
and that the result is accidental because the effect of the injections of the
drugs was expected to be salubrious but was, in fact, fatal to the insured.8"
The Indiana position on situations involving lifting and resulting
strain, hernia and dislocation of bones seems to be that unless there is a
slip or blow accompanying the behavior of the insured, recovery is de-
nied, the means being held not to be accidental.8 " In jurisdictions which
make no distinction between accidental means and accidental result, in-
jury or death, where the insured perforated an existing gastric ulcer
while lifting a heavy shaft,87 or ruptured veins while pushing an auto-
mobile stuck in the snow,8 liability for accidental means has been im-
80. Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 41, 44, 2 N.W.2d 576, 578 (1942),
where the court said: "The accident was not the casual exposure of the fingers to the
X-ray, but the cumulative overdose of it which was unexpected and unanticipated, and
which resulted from almost daily exposure too long continued. The breakdown of the
tissues evidenced by the breaking of the skin and the subsequent cancerous condition
clearly marks the date of the accident."
81. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bruner, 153 N.E.2d 616 (Ind. App. 1958).
82. Gasklns v. New York Life Ins. Co., 235 La. 461, 104 So. 2d 171 (1958).
83. Taylor v. New York Life Ins. Co., 176 Minn. 171, 222 N.W. 912 (1929).
84. Cooper v. New York Life Ins. Co., 198 Okla. 611, 180 P.2d 654 (1947).
85. But cf. Johnson v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 92 Ga. App. 818, 820, 90
S.E.2d 36, 37 (1955), where the insured died from an injection of penicillin. Two of
four insurance policies involved imposed liability for death from accidental means and
recovery was denied. The other two policies provided for benefits ". . . for death of
the insured resulting directly from bodily injury which was effected accidentally and
through external and violent means." (Emphasis added.) The court held the petition
alleged facts showing the insured's death was accidental and through external and vio-
lent means and that a demurrer as to these two policies should have been overruled.
Even assuming that this is a correct construction of these policies, it would seem that
rare indeed would be the policy holder vho could comprehend this abstruse differentia-
tion between terminology which covers accidental effect but external and violent cause.
86. Orey v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 215 Ind. 305, 19 N.E.2d 547 (1939).
87. Union Life Ins. Co. v. Epperson, 221 Ark. 522, 254 S.W.2d 311 (1953).
88. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Wise, 207 Okla. 622, 251 P.2d 1058 (1952).
NOTES
posed-the proximate cause being held to be the exertion, rather than a
pre-existing infirmity. While Indiana allows recovery for sunstroke
when other jurisdictions following the classical rule do not, 9 jurisdic-
tions which repudiate the distinction allow recovery in sunstroke or heat-
stroke situations as in the case of working in the sun on a railroad or
firefighting or other voluntary exposure to the sun's rays by the insured.9"
The ramifications of application of the liberal rule are further seen
in the often litigated situations involving an insured taking excessive
dosages of medicine which have caused death. Jurisdictions following
the classical view hold the means are not accidental where the insured
has taken an overdose of barbiturates,9" or an overdose of paraldehyde,92
unless there is a slip or mishap in calculating the dosage, as opposed to
miscalculating the effect of the intended dosage. In jurisdictions fol-
lowing the liberal view, however, once suicidal intent has been negated
and questions of exception clauses on poison have been put aside,9" re-
covery has been granted where the insured took an overdose of luminal
for nerves,9" an overdose of veronal for an earache,9" or an overdose of
laudanum."0 Unexpected consequences may provide an accidental quality
which is necessary under the liberal view.
A study of cases under jurisdictions following the liberal view in-
dicates that there is a definite standard which is being followed; proxi-
mate cause and a reasonable interpretation of the insurance policy in
view of its purpose and its meaning to the insured are the main guide-
lines of these decisions. The harshness of what is frequently an illogical
result and its effect upon the insured are avoided when the courts refrain
from attempting to ascertain if a given injury was caused by accidental
means.
89. See notes 57, 58, 59 supra.
90. Huss v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 37 F. Supp. 364 (D. Conn. 1941);
Raley v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 117 A.2d 110 (D.C. App. 1955); Provident Life & Acc.
Ins. Co. v. Green, 172 Okla. 591, 46 P.2d 372 (1935); Goethe v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 183 S.C. 199, 190 S.E. 451 (1937).
91. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gutowske, 49 Del. 233, 113 A.2d 579 (1955).
92. Murphy v. Western & So. Life Ins. Co., 262 S.W.2d 340 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953).
93. The popular meaning of the word "poison" refers to substances which in small
doses (as opposed to overdoses) will cause loss of life. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v.
Hemenover, 100 Col. 231, 67 P.2d 80 (1937).
94. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Hemenover, supra, note 93.
95. Mansbacher v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 273 N.Y. 140, 7 N.E.2d 18
(1937).
96. Carter v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 Pac. 259 (1925).
